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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________________________________ 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This is a trade dress infringement action in which plaintiff 
Versa Products Company, Inc. ("Versa") contends that defendant 
Bifold Company (Manufacturing) Ltd. ("Bifold") infringed the 
trade dress of Versa's B-316 directional control valve, a device 
commonly used in control panels of offshore oil-drilling rigs to 
facilitate emergency shutdowns, by marketing its Domino Junior 
valve, which Versa maintains copies the product configuration of 
the B-316.1  The action was brought under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (West Supp. 1994), New Jersey's 
Unfair Competition Law, 56 N.J.S.A. § 4-1 to -2 (1989), and New 
Jersey's common law of unfair competition.  Following a bench 
trial the district court found that the trade dress of Versa's 
valves had met the nonfunctionality and distinctiveness 
requirements of our trade dress jurisprudence, and that there was 
                     
    
1
.    As in Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, 
Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1439 (3d Cir. 1994), "we will employ the 
designation `product configuration' to refer to trade dress 
alleged in the product itself, whether in a specific feature or 
in some combination or arrangement of features, and to 
distinguish that type of trade dress from `product packaging.'" 
  
a likelihood of confusion of the sources of Bifold's Domino 
Junior and Versa's B-316 valves.  Accordingly, the court entered 
a permanent injunction against Bifold, precluding it from selling 
its Domino Junior valve (in its present form) anywhere in the 
United States.  Bifold appeals all aspects of the district 
court's rulings. 
 We need not reach the nonfunctionality and distinctiveness 
questions because the appeal may be disposed of on the likelihood 
of confusion issue, in connection with which we are called upon 
to determine whether the jurisprudence that lowers the standard 
to a "possibility of confusion" where the alleged infringer is a 
"second comer" applies in the trade dress product configuration 
context.  We also must explicate the elements of the confusion 
standard in this context.  We conclude that the lowered standard 
(applied by the district court) does not apply and that some but 
not all of the "Scott factors," see Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's 
Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978), are pertinent, 
because of policy considerations applicable in product 
configuration cases.  Applying this approach we conclude that the 
district court's finding of a likelihood of confusion is clearly 
erroneous.  We will, therefore, reverse the order of the district 
court and vacate the permanent injunction. 
 
  
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Versa, a New Jersey corporation with subsidiaries abroad, 
designs and manufactures pneumatic and hydraulic directional 
control valves.  Bifold, an English corporation, competes with 
Versa and markets a line of control valves and related products 
and services to the offshore oil industry.  Versa alleges that 
Bifold has engaged in unfair competition in its marketing of the 
Domino Junior -- a valve manufactured by Bifold and adapted to 
the harsh offshore oil and petrochemical environments -- by 
copying the trade dress, i.e., the distinctive appearance, of the 
product configuration of Versa's B-316 valve. 
 The most significant feature of valves designed for offshore 
applications is their stainless steel composition, used to 
withstand the corrosive effects of salt air and sour gas fumes.  
In offshore drilling platforms these valves are typically aligned 
in small control panels containing up to fifty modular valve 
bodies with a standard configuration but which, by attaching one 
of various actuators and making minor adjustments, may be adapted 
to a variety of applications.  The panel design engineers devise 
the functional specifications of panels around the capacities of 
particular valves, selecting valves based on their functionality, 
reliability, availability, and price.  The valves themselves are 
not visible from the front of a control panel when installed; 
only knobs, buttons, and status indicator actuators protrude. 
  
 A.  Versa's B-316 Valve 
 Versa began producing brass valves (its "V" series) in 1949.  
Versa dresses the series, consisting at present of an entire line 
of valves well known in the industry, with contoured lines and 
shaping that the district court found "form a distinctive product 
appearance that has been associated with Versa for decades."  In 
the late 1970's Versa designed the B-316 line of stainless steel 
valves, the subject of this litigation.  Versa initially 
fashioned them of stainless steel bar stock, and the valves were 
plain and unadorned.  Because of the waste of valuable metal 
associated with the machining process and the substantial manual 
labor needed to drill each valve individually, Versa converted to 
a cast version of the valve as soon as sales levels justified the 
substantial economic investment in a casting mold. 
 The two versions of the valve serve the same function and 
are interchangeable.  Versa deliberately set about to give the 
cast version of the B-316 the "Versa look," that is, to have it 
resemble in appearance the V-series of Versa valves.  FF 41.  
Versa's desire to have the valve be clearly associated with Versa 
in the market was a primary impetus for its election to manu-
facture the cast version of the B-316. 
 The modular B-316 valve is comprised of a valve body and, 
optionally, one or more attached actuators used to manipulate the 
moving parts in the valve body.  The valve is a three-way valve, 
meaning that it has three ports or openings (for the ingress or 
  
egress of gas or fluid), which are threaded to ¼" NPT, a national 
standard and industry requirement.  The ports open into an inner 
chamber in the valve body, which houses a spool moved by an 
actuator (such as a button, knob, or electronically controlled 
solenoid actuator) to open or close the port, controlling fluid 
flow. 
 The configuration and function of the actuators provided 
with a valve are driven by customer demand; however, the use of 
certain actuators (most of which Versa purchases from other 
vendors) is standard with the B-316.  Versa has used the same 
knob actuator for 40 years, although many others are available.  
It also uses a particular status indicator, which indicates the 
valve's position; a particular button actuator, which is shrouded 
to prevent accidental actuation; a self-produced manual latch, 
which locks the valve spool in the open or closed position; and a 
self-produced pilot actuator, which responds to pressure in an 
attached fluid line to control the spool's position. 
 Located at each end of a valve is a flange, both of which 
serve as faces to mount the actuators and to provide a flat 
surface for attachment to the control panels; holes are drilled 
into the flanges to allow the actuators to be securely mounted.  
A longitudinal top rib runs along the top of the valve body to 
allow customers to attach solenoid (computer controlled) 
actuators, to provide strength, and to serve as a casting gate 
(an opening in the casting mold through which the molten metal is 
  
poured).  A smaller bottom rib was added to provide parallelism 
in the product's appearance and to assist in the casting process.  
Finally, the valve has three mounting holes which are positioned 
to provide stable mounting to a panel or other flat surface.  
Each aspect of the valve serves a specific function essential to 
the valve's operation, cost, performance, or ease of manufacture.  
The design of each actuator is functional.  Functionality 
dictates the overall cast design, but does not dictate its 
external appearance. 
 The B-316 valve's mold imprints the manufacturer's name 
("VERSA") and place of origin ("N.J. U.S.A.") on the valve.  
Versa also stamps a date code and rivets a metal label displaying 
the Versa name, logo, and part number onto the valve.  Versa 
currently dominates the United States market for stainless steel 
valves.  Aside from Bifold, only Versa sells cast stainless steel 
valves; other competitors use a cylindrical bar stock. 
  
 B.  Bifold's DOMINO JUNIOR Series Valve 
 As part of Bifold's continuing efforts to expand its product 
line, in 1985 it introduced the Domino series modular valves.   
Although originally machined from standard bar stock (like 
Versa's B-316), the Domino valves became sufficiently successful 
to warrant the investment needed to design a cast version.  An 
outside casting company designed the cast version of the Domino; 
Bifold had no involvement in the process.  Like a B-316, the 
Domino valve has three cylindrical ports, a top rib for housing a 
solenoid feed, flanges, and a range of actuators. 
 Because the Domino was too large for many of its customers' 
needs, however, Bifold designed the "Domino Junior" modular valve 
in 1990, producing it at first from bar stock.2  In late 1991, 
eight years after the cast version of the B-316 became available, 
Bifold introduced its cast version of the Domino Junior.  Bifold 
at the time erroneously believed that Versa had a "monopoly" on 
the wellhead control panel valve market, and created the cast 
version of the Domino Junior to "bury Versa." 
 Bifold was aware of the B-316's appearance and design 
features because it had seen the product at various trade shows.  
The district court did not credit Bifold's claims that it de-
signed the Domino Junior as a scaled down version of the Domino 
                     
    
2
.    A fact-finding inconsistent with the tenor of the ones 
described here is that "Bifold used the Domino Junior bar stock 
valve as an excuse to justify its look-alike cast version of the 
Domino Junior product." 
  
and that it did not copy the B-316.3  It found instead that, 
before and during its design of the Domino Junior cast mold, 
Bifold examined and largely copied Versa's B-316 valve, a sample 
of which it had obtained through its agent in Denmark.  For 
example, the court found that Bifold, which regularly uses metric 
sizes in its valves, took measurements from the B-316 and used a 
metric conversion of the B-316's imperial standard size.  Bifold 
also sent a cast B-316 valve to Manchester Tool Services, which 
it selected to be the manufacturer of the cast version of the 
Domino Junior, as a model for the cast version of the Domino 
Junior.  The two valves (the B-316 and the Domino Junior) are 
not, however, interchangeable in the field, and "replacing a 
Versa B-316 cast valve with a Bifold Domino Junior cast valve in 
an existing control panel could be problematic." 
 The district court also found that Bifold lacked the 
expertise to design the cast version of the Domino Junior, had 
presented misleading testimony about who produced a prototype 
drawing of the Domino Junior, and had backdated documents to 
create the false appearance that it had designed the valve.  The 
court found that BSA Precision Castings, Ltd. ("BSA"), which had 
designed the cast version of the Domino valve, was involved in 
the design of the cast version of the Domino Junior valve.  
During the time that BSA participated in the design of the cast 
version of the Domino Junior, it had in its possession drawings 
                     
    
3
.    It also did not credit the claims of Bifold's experts. 
  
and castings of the B-316's major components, as well as Versa's 
actuators.  BSA had obtained the drawings, actuators, and actual 
samples of valve components from Versa three years earlier when 
it had provided Versa with a quote for the casting of the B-316.  
The court found that BSA used this data to design a casting of 
the Domino Junior valve as a look-alike of the Versa B-316, 
despite the fact that Bifold had asked BSA to give "due 
consideration to the appearance of the larger Domino valves." 
 Although the Domino Junior and B-316 do, in fact, look quite 
similar, the district court described a number of differences 
between the two manufacturers' valves.  Because the Domino 
Junior's ports extend outward from the valve body, whereas the B-
316's ports are flush with the valve body, the Domino Junior is 
slightly wider than the B-316.  The Domino Junior ports' threads 
have metric dimensions.  The Domino Junior is made of more metal 
and weighs about thirty percent more than the B-316.  The stroke 
-- the distance an actuator must move the internal spool to 
switch the valve's ports -- also differs from that of the B-316.  
Because Bifold electroplates its valves, the Domino Junior body 
has a duller finish than the B-316.  The Domino Junior also has 
thicker flanges and ribs than does the B-316.  The valves' 
mounting holes have different centers.  Bifold purchases its 
status indicators from a different company than Versa uses, and 
these indicators have a different size, appearance, and 
configuration from Versa's.  Like Versa, Bifold produces its own 
  
manual latch, but makes it out of two cast pieces and gives it 
rounded edges, whereas Versa uses a single piece of rectangular 
bar stock material. 
 The Domino Junior valves are "block-before-bleed" (meaning 
fluid flow is completely blocked during the moment required to 
change states when the valve is activated), whereas the B-316 
includes that feature only as an option.  The Domino Junior ports 
are universal (meaning that any port can be an inlet or an outlet 
port), though Bifold customizes each valve as either normally 
open or normally closed; in contrast, Versa offers universal 
application only as an option.  Like Versa, Bifold casts its name 
into the Domino Junior's valve body and bolts onto it a metal 
label prominently displaying the Bifold name. 
 Despite all these differences, the court concluded that 
"[t]he Bifold Domino Junior valve and actuators are virtually 
identical in external design and visual appearance to the Versa 
B-316 valve."  It found an identity in general body 
configuration, body length, flanges, distance between ports, 
valve mounting holes, actuator mounting holes, ribs, spring cap 
(which returns the spool back to its original position), buttons, 
button caps, status indicators, knobs, manual latching pins, and 
pilot caps.  The valve bodies, buttons, button caps, knobs, 
status indicators, and manual latching mechanism used by other 
competitors in the industry look quite different from both the 
Domino Junior's and the B-316's.  The court discounted the 
  
dissimilarity of the solenoid actuators attached to the valve 
bodies by Versa and Bifold because only a small portion of 
Versa's B-316 valves sold include solenoid actuators. 
 C.  Marketing and Sales of the Valves 
 In order to determine whether Bifold had engaged in unfair 
competition with Versa, the district court considered whether 
consumers were likely to confuse the sources of the two 
companies' valves in light of the ways in which the two valves 
are marketed and sold.  The court found that valves of this sort 
are not sold off the shelf or selected on sight.  Rather, both 
manufacturers sell their valves based on functional 
specifications detailed in schematic diagrams, manufacturers' 
catalogs, or specification sheets and samples available at trade 
shows and sales presentations.  The valves are selected by multi-
digit part numbers identifying the particular variation desired.  
The purchasers and users of the valves are qualified, 
knowledgeable persons who comprehend the installation and use of 
the valves.  They typically prepare specifications designating 
which manufacturer's valve they prefer to use in their system 
before placing the order. 
 Versa, the more established manufacturer, has sold over 
100,000 B-316 valves, and is currently selling over 16,000 per 
year.  This gives it a fifty to fifty-five percent market share 
of valves sold for use in emergency shutdown systems in the 
United States.  Bifold has only recently begun marketing its 
  
Domino Junior valve in the United States, and immediately stopped 
its efforts to open the United States market pending the outcome 
of this litigation. 
 Versa and its B-316 valve have an excellent reputation for 
producing a high quality product.  This quality level is very 
important in emergency shutdown offshore drilling, for the 
failure of a valve could cause loss of human life and property as 
well as severe environmental damage.  Versa has therefore 
subjected its B-316 valve to rigorous quality control tests, and 
the valve has performed faithfully in the field. 
 The district court found that, because of the availability 
and outstanding reputation of the B-316 cast valve for over ten 
years, the overall appearance and contours of the B-316 have come 
to distinguish the valve as Versa's (in the industry and to 
Versa's customers), with the valve body constituting the most 
defining aspect of the Versa look.  The valve's overall 
appearance assists Versa in marketing its product, and Versa 
features this appearance widely in trade journals, catalogues, 
brochures, bulletins, trade shows, and sales exhibitions.  The 
court also found that Versa deliberately created the B-316's 
distinctive appearance (contrasting with the other valves 
available in the market at the time) to identify the valve in the 
market as a Versa product. 
 The district court found that Bifold hired Versa's former 
regional marketing manager of six years, James Carr, III, to sell 
  
its new Domino Junior valve.  Carr sells both Versa and Bifold 
valves, sometimes to the same customers.  To solicit Domino 
Junior sales in early 1993, Carr approached Gordon Fraleigh, an 
employee of the Fraleigh Company, which for years had sold Versa 
products to customers in the petroleum industry.  Carr 
represented to Fraleigh, whom he had known for many years, that 
Bifold had developed an "exact copy" of the B-316 which would 
"fit in perfect" as a substitute for the B-316, and inquired 
whether Fraleigh would like to distribute the Domino Junior.  
Thereupon, Fraleigh became confused as to the relationship 
between Versa and Bifold.  Bifold has also contemplated 
contacting other Versa distributors to sell its valves. 
  
 D.  Likelihood of Confusion 
 Beyond the confusion on Fraleigh's part, the district court 
found that some, but not all, consumers of the B-316 valves are 
sophisticated, and that the likelihood of confusion as to the 
source of the Domino Junior is enhanced with respect to the 
unsophisticated consumers.  This finding is undercut by the 
district court's finding, see supra p.12, that the purchasers are 
knowledgeable and understand the valves.  We note, however, that 
these findings might be resolved by noting that the latter 
finding assumes expansion of Versa's market.  Indeed, the opinion 
later suggests that any unsophisticated consumers exist only as 
"potential new customers" in "untapped" markets, that is, that 
all the current customers are sophisticated.  See Mem. Op. at 90.  
Because there will in those potential expansion markets be no 
likelihood of confusion based on the district court's theory 
(namely, that consumers familiar with Versa's trade dress will 
mistakenly believe Bifold is affiliated with Versa, see infra at 
68-74), we will ignore the court's "expansion" finding and 
consider only its finding that the purchasers are knowledgeable. 
 In addition, one customer forwarded to Bifold a telefax 
initially addressed to Versa.  And Frank Vetter, a Vice President 
and Chief Operating Officer of Versa, testified that he was 
advised of confusion of the products at trade shows. 
 Because of the valves' "virtual identity in appearance" and 
the fact that Bifold has not sold products in the United States 
  
previously, the district court concluded that a Versa customer in 
the United States might reasonably assume that Versa and Bifold 
are related companies or that the Domino Junior is otherwise 
related to Versa.  However, since Bifold had sold only two valves 
in the United States, both to distributors, the court found there 
had been little opportunity for Versa to document instances of 
actual confusion. 
 
II.  THE DISTRICT COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS4 
 The district court noted at the outset that Section 43(a) 
provides a cause of action for unprivileged imitation of trade 
dress -- defined as the "overall design or appearance of a 
product or its packaging" -- because it involves actual or 
potential deception.  Trade dress, it held, consists not of 
individual features, but of the overall appearance of the 
product.  We turn then, to the court's more specific legal 
conclusions. 
 Recognizing that unpatented functional features may be 
freely copied regardless of any likelihood of confusion -- and 
Versa has not patented the design of its B-316 valve -- the 
district court first concluded that the trade dress of the B-316 
                     
    
4
.    Subject matter jurisdiction was grounded in the federal 
question statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1993), since Versa's 
cause of action arises under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West Supp. 1994).  Personal jurisdiction was 
based on the defendant's consent.  The court exercised 
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's pendent state law 
claim. 
  
was nonfunctional.  The court next concluded that the B-316's 
trade dress was "inherently distinctive,"5 or, in the 
alternative, possessed acquired distinctiveness because it had 
acquired secondary meaning.6  The distinctiveness finding is 
problematic because the district court evaluated inherent 
distinctiveness using a legal standard that this court has since 
held to be improper.  See Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic 
Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1441-42 (3rd Cir. 1994) (rejecting 
the trademark distinctiveness taxonomy as the measure of inherent 
distinctiveness for trade dress in product configurations).  And 
although we can scarcely blame the district court, whose analysis 
of functionality largely tracked this court's various legal 
formulations, its finding of nonfunctionality is also problematic 
in view of the conflicting formulations of functionality used, as 
                     
    
5
.    The court concluded that the trade dress was inherently 
distinctive because it was "arbitrary," meaning it was "not 
dictated by functional considerations" (which appears to be the 
same standard that the court employed for its functionality 
inquiry). 
    
6
.    "Secondary meaning" denotes that the purchasing public 
associates the design of the product with a particular source.  
Secondary meaning need be proven only if the product is not 
inherently distinctive.  The court held that secondary meaning 
was established by the length and continuity of the plaintiff's 
use -- here, continuously for 10 years; by the strength of the 
buyers' mental associations -- here, purchasers associate the 
appearance of the B-316 with Versa; by the extent of sales and 
advertising -- here, Versa has sold tens of thousands of B-316 
valves and has advertised widely; and, most persuasively 
according to the district court, by the evidence of intentional 
copying. 
  
outlined in the margin.7  Although we have misgivings about these 
two issues, it is the district court's third conclusion that 
forms the focus of our opinion today. 
                     
    
7
.    The district court determined that a product feature is 
functional if and only if "it affects their purpose, action or 
performance, or the facility or economy of processing, handling 
or using them."  Treating functionality as a matter for fact 
finding, the court placed the burden on Versa to show that "its 
trade dress serves no purpose except to identify Versa."  But 
then it held that trade dress is functional only "if it is essen-
tial to the use or purpose of the article or . . . affects the 
cost or quality of the article," that a design is "essential" 
"only if it is dictated by the functions to be performed," and 
that a design is "essential to [an item's] use" only if the 
particular design of the whole assembly is essential (internal 
quotation marks omitted, emphases supplied).  The court's inquiry 
thus focused on the extent to which the design feature was 
related to the usefulness of the product.  Then, setting forth 
yet a third standard, the court held that a product design is 
nonfunctional if, viewed as a whole, the design "primarily serves 
a legitimate trademark purpose -- identifying the source of the 
product -- . . . even though it might also serve functional 
purposes" (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 The several standards for functionality described by the 
district court reflect varying articulations found in opinions of 
this court.  Compare, e.g., Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt 
Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d at 635 ("`Proof of nonfunctionality 
generally requires a showing that the element of the product 
serves no purpose other than identification.'") (quoting SK&F, 
Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Lab., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1063 (3d 
Cir. 1980)) with Merchant & Evans, Inc., 963 F.2d at 634 ("`[T]he 
question is whether a particular feature of a product is 
substantially related to its value as a product or service, i.e., 
if the feature is a part of the "function" served, or whether the 
primary value of a particular feature is the identification of 
the provider . . . .'") (quoting United States Golf Ass'n v. St. 
Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 The district court concluded that although a large number of 
the B-316's features were functional, their combination into a 
particular form was not.  It found that the B-316 valves' overall 
design did not result from "significant cost and manufacturing 
considerations," and that if the appearance of the B-316 were 
altered, "nothing of substantial value in the product [would be] 
lost."  In sum, the district court found that "[t]he appearance 
  
 The district court held that to prevail on a trade dress 
infringement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of 
confusion, but not actual confusion.  It held that Versa could do 
so here if it could show that an appreciable number of buyers are 
likely to become confused as to the origin of the Domino Junior 
valve.  Importantly, the court further held that the threshold 
for likelihood of confusion is lower when a newcomer (or "second 
comer") violates a long-established trade dress. 
 The district court then seemed to apply the ten factors for 
likelihood of confusion that this court enumerated in Scott Paper 
Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978).  
See CL 57.  Under Scott, the threshold issue is the question of 
similarity of product appearances, and the court found that the 
Domino Junior's appearance was "virtually identical" to the B-
(..continued) 
of the Versa B-316 valve presents a particular combination and 
arrangement of design elements that are original to plaintiff's 
valve, that identify it as a valve of Versa . . . and that 
distinguish it from other valves.  This arrangement of features 
is not required by the function of the valve itself and is 
entitled to protection."  Pointing to other competing valves, the 
court found that Bifold could compete with Versa's B-316 without 
copying Versa's particular configuration. 
 A party entering a market, the court continued, has a duty 
"to so name and dress his product as to avoid likelihood of users 
confusing it with the product of the first comer."  Since, in its 
view, Bifold had overtly and intentionally copied Versa's trade 
dress in direct competition with Versa, the court concluded that 
Bifold had infringed Versa's trade dress and engaged in unfair 
competition.  While Bifold could produce a valve with three ports 
with modular actuators and solenoid feeds, the court said, Bifold 
could not copy the particular, arbitrary combination and 
arrangement of design elements that identify and distinguish 
Versa valves. 
  
316's and hence that there was a likelihood of confusion.   The 
district court reasoned that Bifold's clear designation on the 
product that it was the manufacturer, while relevant to Bifold's 
duty to take reasonable steps to prevent deception, was only one 
factor to be assessed in resolving the confusion issue. 
 The district court found that "[a]n intent to copy trade 
dress and/or finding of copying by a junior user is often alone 
dispositive of a finding of likelihood of confusion," and that 
since Bifold had copied Versa's design there was a likelihood of 
confusion.  The court also found a likelihood of confusion 
because of the "competitive proximity" of the goods, which 
"strongly favors a finding of confusion," since the court found 
that the Domino Junior can replace the B-316 at the point of 
conception of the panels.8 
 Although the district court concluded that Versa was not 
entitled to damages because Bifold had only sold two of its 
valves in the United States, it granted Versa permanent 
injunctive relief on the ground that the company's good will was 
threatened by Bifold's attempt to reap the benefits of Versa's 
reputation (by basing the appearance of the Domino Junior on a 
                     
    
8
.    The court additionally considered the "strength" of 
Versa's trade dress, evidence (albeit slim) of actual confusion, 
the method in which the valves are sold, and the labeling of 
Bifold's Domino Junior.  Finally, the court also essentially held 
that New Jersey's Unfair Competition Law, 56 N.J.S.A. § 4-1 to -2 
(1989), and its common law of unfair competition parallel the 
unfair competition cause of action under Section 43(a), and hence 
that Versa prevailed on those causes of action as well. 
  
Versa product).  The court determined that the injunction had to 
cover not only the appearance of the article actually the subject 
of the lawsuit, but also all "confusingly similar" appearances.  
It therefore crafted an injunction enjoining Bifold from 
manufacturing, selling, etc., any cast valve which "has an 
external design and visual appearance confusingly similar to the 
cast Versa B-316 valve, described herein and shown in Exhibit A."  
Order and Injunction at 5.9 
 The court then held Versa to be entitled to attorneys' fees.  
Recognizing that attorneys' fees can be awarded to the 
"prevailing party" only in "exceptional cases," the court found 
Bifold's deliberate and willful infringement to be exceptional.   
This appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1132. 
 
                     
    
9
.    The court concluded its opinion with the caveat that, 
should its injunction be overturned, "an alternate albeit less 
efficacious course can be considered," namely, attaching a metal 
label providing "made in England" and "not a Versa product" onto 
the Domino Junior.  Mem. op. at 92 n.3. 
  
III.  DISCUSSION 
 To obtain trade dress protection for the B-316 under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, Versa had to prove that (a) the design 
was non-functional, (b) the design was inherently distinctive or 
distinctive by virtue of having acquired secondary meaning, and 
(c) there was a likelihood of confusion.  See Two Pesos, Inc. v. 
Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2758 (1992).10  As discussed 
supra, the district court found that Versa had met each of these 
requirements, and it therefore permanently enjoined Bifold from 
copying the B-316's trade dress and ordered Bifold to pay 
attorney's fees.  We limit our discussion to the final element 
Versa needed to establish to prevail on its trade dress 
infringement claim -- the likelihood of consumer confusion as to 
the source of Bifold's Domino Junior. 
 Such consumer confusion is, of course, at the heart of 
trademark law.  See, e.g., Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & 
Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 1984).  Likelihood of 
confusion is a factual matter, subject to review for clear error, 
see Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 747 F.2d 844, 
851 (3d Cir. 1984), which exists when, "giving all due deference 
to the opportunity of the trial judge to evaluate the credibility 
of witnesses and to weigh the evidence," Litton Sys., Inc. v. 
Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (emphasis 
                     
    
10
.    New Jersey statutory and common law of unfair 
competition require essentially the same elements.  See SK&F, 
Co.,625 F.2d at 1065. 
  
omitted) (citing Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 
844, 855, 102 S. Ct. 2182, 2188 (1982)), we are "left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 
1511 (1985). 
 A.  "Likelihood" vs. "Possibility" of Confusion 
 Generally, "the law does not require that a competitor 
insure against all possible confusion or the likelihood thereof."  
CHARLES E. MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG, III, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION:  
LANHAM ACT § 43(A) § 3.08[1], at 3-71 (1989, Release #5, May 1994) 
[hereinafter MCKENNEY & LONG, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION].  Rather, a 
plaintiff may prevail in a trade dress infringement action only 
if it shows that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent 
consumers of the type of product in question are likely to be 
confused as to the source of the goods.  See, e.g., Nikon, Inc. 
v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1993); West Point Mfg. 
Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 589 & n.2 (6th Cir. 
1955).  "The mere possibility that a customer may be misled is 
not enough."  Surgical Supply Serv., Inc. v. Adler, 321 F.2d 536, 
539 (3d Cir. 1963). 
 Although this usual formulation of trade dress infringement 
requires a showing of a likelihood or probability of confusion, 
this standard has been relaxed in some cases.  Where an alleged 
infringer was new to an area and the plaintiff was well-
established, this court has at times replaced the "likelihood of 
  
confusion" requirement with a lower "possibility of confusion" 
standard.  These cases have all involved actions for trademark or 
tradename infringement, not trade dress, and certainly not trade 
dress alleged in a product configuration.  See Merchant & Evans, 
Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 637-38 (3d Cir. 
1992) (considering "possibility of confusion" with respect to "a 
name or mark," in particular, a "`Z' logo" alleged to be 
confusingly similar to a "`Zip-Rib' trademark"); Country Floors, 
Inc. v. Partnership Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 
1065 (3d Cir. 1991) (directing application of "possibility of 
confusion" standard to "Country Tiles" and "Country Floors" names 
or marks); Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903, 908-09 
("a case of a first coined word and a second coined word 
resembling it").  We must therefore consider whether the 
"possibility of confusion" standard should govern product 
configuration trade dress cases.  Since unfair competition law 
regarding product configurations will diverge substantially in 
its incidents from the law regarding product packaging, Duraco, 
40 F.3d at 1439, we begin our consideration by examining the 
rationale underlying the "possibility of confusion" cases. 
 Telechron, Inc. offered some explanation for the lowering of 
the requirements for showing trademark infringement in certain 
situations.  In that case the plaintiff used the name "Telechron" 
starting in 1919 as a trademark for its electric clocks and other 
timing and switching devices.  The defendant Telicon Corporation 
  
began marketing radio and television sets under the "Telicon" 
name for the first time in 1946.  Agreeing with the district 
court, this court held that "`Telicon' is a colorable imitation 
of `Telechron' within the conception of trade-mark infringement."  
Telechron, Inc., 198 F.2d at 908. 
 In an opinion by Judge Hastie, the court explained that the 
"`degree of resemblance necessary to constitute an infringement 
is incapable of exact definition.'"  Telechron, Inc., 198 F.2d at 
908 (quoting McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 245, 251 
(1877)).  We emphasized the strong aural similarity of the marks 
and the evidence of actual confusion, concluding that the 
evidence was "adequate substantiation of tendency to confusion 
inherent in the obvious similarity of the words themselves."  
Telechron, Inc., 198 F.2d at 908.  Only then, expressly as an 
additional consideration, did we observe that this was "a type of 
case where a court properly requires the second comer to stay 
clearly away from the original mark," and thus that "`any 
possible doubt of the likelihood of damage should be resolved in 
favor of the [first user].'"  Id. at 908-09 (quoting Lambert 
Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton Chem. Corp., 219 F. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 
1915) (Learned Hand, J.)). 
 We recognize that application of the "keep clear" policy 
embodied by the trademark "possibility of confusion" standard 
would not be entirely senseless in the context of alleged 
infringement of trade dress, even where the dress consists not in 
  
a product's packaging but in a nonfunctional product 
configuration.  To the extent that product configurations are 
protectable, a Johnny-come-lately copier arguably creates a 
greater risk than one who more promptly markets a copy that 
consumers will be misled by a substantially identical 
configuration into thinking the newcomer's product to be that of 
the established business, for there will have been more time for 
the public to come to associate that configuration with a single 
source.  In and of itself, however, that is no reason to change 
the measure of confusion (from "probability" to "possibility") 
required to make out a Lanham Act violation.  Rather, it is at 
most a factor properly taken into account in assessing the 
likelihood of confusion. 
 The trademark "possibility of confusion" standard must 
therefore be supported by other considerations.  We believe that 
the primary reasons for lowering the measure of confusion when a 
newcomer copies an established trademark are the general lack of 
legitimate reasons for copying a competitor's mark, see, e.g., 
American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 
562-63 (2d Cir. 1953) ("`Why [the defendant] should have chosen a 
mark that had long been employed by [the plaintiff] and had 
become known to the trade instead of adopting some other means of 
identifying its goods is hard to see unless there was a 
deliberate purpose to obtain some advantage from the trade which 
[the plaintiff] had built up.'"), and the high degree of reliance 
  
by consumers on trademarks as indicators of the source of 
products.  Whether or not these considerations translate to the 
realm of product packaging, we think that with respect to product 
configurations the significance of each of the factors is greatly 
diminished. 
 First, the mere copying of product configurations does not 
suggest that the copier was necessarily trying to capitalize on 
the goodwill of the source of the original product.  See Duraco, 
40 F.3d at 1453; see also infra at 40-48 (discussing implications 
of defendant's intent to copy).  A presumption to the contrary 
would be mandated, if ever, only in the narrow class of cases 
where both (1) a product configuration is desirable to consumers 
primarily because of the configuration's inherent or acquired 
identification with the original source, and (2) the copier 
adopts affirmatively misleading labelling and/or marketing for 
the copied product, cf. Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 
134 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1943) ("The pirate flies the flag of 
the one he would loot.  The free and honorable non-pirate flies 
the colors of his own distinctive ensign."). 
 Second, although a product's trade dress in the form of its 
configuration could function as an indicator of the product's 
source, product configurations in general are not reliable as 
source indicators, for functional configurations are not 
protected and thus may be freely copied, see Duraco, 40 F.3d at 
1441, 1448-49, 1451, and inherently distinctive configurations 
  
will be rare, see id. at 1446.  Since substantially identical 
products are often sold by different manufacturers under 
different names, consumers are accustomed to relying on product 
packaging and trademarks to identify product sources.  Indeed, if 
any modification of the likelihood of confusion standard is 
justified in the product configuration context, the standard 
might well be heightened, perhaps to a "high probability of 
confusion."  Nevertheless, we see no need to adopt such a 
standard today, preferring for now merely to reject the 
"possibility of confusion" standard for product configuration 
infringement cases, and adhering to the conventional "likelihood 
of confusion" standard. 
 B.  The Scott Factors in the Product Configuration Context 
 Having concluded that the appropriate standard in this 
product configuration trade dress infringement action is a 
likelihood of confusion, we must determine what that inquiry 
entails in this context.  Although the law of trade dress in 
product configurations will differ in key respects from the law 
of trademarks or of trade dress in product packaging, settled law 
provides the starting point for our analysis. 
 We stated in Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 
930 F.2d 277, 297 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 373 (1991), 
that the analysis of the likelihood of confusion requires a court 
to evaluate a number of factors: 
 (1) the degree of similarity between the owner's mark and 
the alleged infringing mark; (2) the strength of [the] 
owner's mark; (3) the price of the goods and other factors 
  
indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers 
when making a purchase; (4) the length of time [the] 
defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual 
confusion arising; (5) the intent of the defendant in 
adopting the mark; (6) the evidence of actual confusion; (7) 
whether the goods, though not in competition, are marketed 
through the same channels of trade and advertised through 
the same media; (8) the extent to which the targets of the 
parties' sale efforts are the same; (9) the relationship of 
the goods in the minds of the public because of the 
similarity of function; (10) other facts suggesting that the 
consuming public might expect the prior owner to manufacture 
a product in the defendant's market. 
Id. at 293 (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 
589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978)); accord Charles Jacquin et 
Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 474-75 (3d 
Cir. 1990); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 (Tent. 
Draft No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990).  This test was developed not for 
product configuration cases but for "cases of alleged trademark 
infringement and unfair competition by a producer of a non-
competing product," see Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro 
Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 473 (3d Cir. 1994), and not all of the 
factors will be appropriate for or function the same way with 
respect to trade dress inhering in a product configuration, so we 
consider them in turn. 
  
1.  Similarity of Appearance  (Scott Factor 1) 
 In trademark infringement cases, the first and primary 
factor to be considered in the likelihood of confusion inquiry is 
"the degree of similarity between the owner's mark and the 
alleged infringing mark."  See Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 293.  
In trade dress infringement cases where product packaging is at 
issue, the corresponding factor is the similarity of the 
protectable trade dress.  Similarity of appearance is properly 
considered paramount in trademark and product packaging trade 
dress infringement cases, for unless the allegedly infringing 
mark or dress is substantially similar to the protectable mark or 
dress, it is highly unlikely that consumers will confuse the 
product sources represented by the different marks or trade 
dresses. 
 For the same reason, substantial similarity of appearance is 
necessarily a prerequisite to a finding of likelihood of 
confusion in product configuration cases.  Unlike in trade mark 
or product packaging trade dress cases, however, a finding of 
substantial similarity of trade dress in a product configuration 
does not by itself strongly suggest a likelihood of confusion.  
Consumers have grown accustomed to relying on trademarks as 
trustworthy indicators of the source of the product:  that is the 
point of a trade mark.  Perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent, 
consumers also rely on other aspects of product packaging to 
identify the manufacturer.  Such behavior is rational, for in a 
  
trade mark or product packaging case, all the consumer usually 
has to go on to identify the source of the product is the 
trademark and packaging (and any marketing featuring that mark or 
packaging). 
 In a product configuration trade dress infringement case, by 
contrast, consumers do not have to rely on a potentially 
distinctive configuration to identify the source of the 
product;11 rather, they can generally look to the packaging, 
trademarks, and advertising used to market the product, which are 
typically much less ambiguous.  Consumers therefore have less 
need, and so are much less likely, to rely on a product 
configuration as an indicator of the product's source.  
Accordingly, they are less likely to be confused as to the 
sources of two products with substantially similar 
configurations.  Thus, in trade dress infringement suits where 
the dress inheres in a product configuration, the primary factors 
to be considered in assessing likelihood of confusion are the 
product's labeling, packaging, and advertisements.12  "The most 
common and effective means of apprising intending purchasers of 
                     
    
11
.    The product configuration may have acquired 
distinctiveness, or it may be inherently distinctive. 
    
12
.    This observation is consistent with our discussion of 
the Scott factors (also known as the Lapp factors, after 
Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1983)) in 
Fisons Horticulture, Inc., 30 F.3d at 476 n.11, where we stated:  
"The weight given to each factor in the overall picture, as well 
as its weighing for a plaintiff or defendant, must be done on an 
individual fact-specific basis." 
  
the source of goods is a prominent disclosure on the container, 
package, wrapper, or label of the manufacturer's or trader's name 
. . . [and when] that is done, there is no basis for a charge of 
unfair competition."  Venn v. Goedert, 319 F.2d 812, 816 (8th 
Cir. 1963), quoted in Litton Sys., Inc., 728 F.2d at 1446. 
 Indeed, except where consumers ordinarily exercise virtually 
no care in selecting a particular type of product (as may be the 
case with inexpensive disposable or consumable items, cf. Venn, 
supra (cookies)), clarity of labeling in packaging and 
advertising will suffice to preclude almost all possibility of 
consumer confusion as to source stemming from the product's 
configuration.  Cf. Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 467 
F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The presence of [the source's] 
name on the product [stereo speaker cabinets] goes far to 
eliminate confusion of origin.") (emphasis supplied); id. at 310 
("[T]here is hardly likelihood of confusion or palming off when 
the name of the manufacturer is clearly displayed."). 
  
2.  Strength of the Owner's Mark  (Scott Factor 2) 
 In trademark cases, the strength of the owner's mark 
directly affects the likelihood that consumers will be confused 
as to the sources of products bearing substantially similar 
marks.  Strength includes both "[d]istinctiveness on the scale of 
trademarks" and "[c]ommercial strength, or marketplace 
recognition."  Fisons Horticulture, Inc., 30 F.3d at 479.  A 
strong trademark is thus one that carries widespread, immediate 
recognition that one producer (even if unknown) is associated 
with the mark, and so with the product.  If a second comer adopts 
a mark substantially identical to a strong mark, there is a 
correspondingly high likelihood that consumers will mistakenly 
associate the newcomer's product with the owner of the strong 
mark.  The same may be said of a "strong" trade dress consisting 
of a product's packaging. 
 But these observations do not translate literally into the 
product configuration context.  As we have explained elsewhere, 
the trademark distinctiveness scale is ill-suited for application 
to trade dress inhering in a product configuration.  See Duraco, 
40 F.3d at 1440-42.  Having rejected the distinctiveness scale in 
this context, we are left with commercial strength as the measure 
of trade dress strength in a product configuration.  Yet strength 
of a product configuration must mean more than the ability of 
large numbers of consumers to identify the configuration as 
coming from a particular producer.  This would sanction too much 
  
reliance by consumers on product designs that, lacking the 
protection of a patent, are in large measure copyable at will.  
Cf. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1447-48 (criticizing the "capable of 
distinguishing" interpretation of distinctive trade dress). 
 Rather, "strength" of product configuration as relevant to 
determining likelihood of confusion on the part of ordinarily 
careful consumers should be found only if consumers rely on the 
product's configuration to identify the producer of the good.  
This may perhaps be the case with products purchased largely 
because of their appearance, such as "Carebears," cf. American 
Greetings Corp., 807 F.2d at 1142.  Such focus, however, is not 
generally found in and should not be encouraged in the industrial 
design context, where product appearance typically plays a lesser 
role in buyers' selection processes.  Hence, to differentiate 
between these types of product configuration cases, courts should 
require evidence of actual reliance by consumers on a particular 
product configuration as a source indicator before crediting that 
configuration's "strength" toward likelihood of confusion. 
  
3.  Attention Expected of Consumers  (Scott Factor 3) 
 The third Scott factor is "the price of the goods and other 
factors indicative of the care and attention expected of 
consumers when making a purchase."  "The greater the care and 
attention, the less the likelihood of confusion."  Fisons 
Horticulture, Inc., 30 F.3d at 476 n.12.  We believe that this 
factor takes on enhanced importance when a claim is made for 
infringement of trade dress in a product configuration, both as a 
result of the intersection of the patent laws with the Lanham 
Act, and as a function of the difference between a trademark and 
a product configuration. 
 The penumbra of the federal patent laws restricts the degree 
to which courts may grant legal recognition of consumer reliance 
on product configurations as source indicators, for their limited 
scope of protection impliedly imposes restraint on the workings 
of Section 43(a).  Accordingly, we must bear in mind the Supreme 
Court's counsel that "mere inability of the public to tell two 
identical articles apart is not enough to support an injunction 
against copying . . . that which the federal patent laws permit 
to be copied."  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 
225, 232, 84 S. Ct. 784, 789 (1964).13  "[T]he federal policy, 
                     
    
13
.    We recognize that we deal here not only with state 
unfair competition law but also with a federal statute.  It is 
therefore true that the Supremacy Clause does not, as in Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 225, and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 84 S. Ct. 779 (1964), operate to 
bar Section 43(a) from protecting trade dress in the form of the 
product configuration of Versa's B-316 valve. 
  
found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the 
implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy 
whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the 
public domain," Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 
U.S. 234, 237, 84 S. Ct. 779, 782 (1964), is "an ever-present 
consideration," MCKENNEY & LONG, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5.03, at 
5-25. 
 Furthermore, one expects a consumer exercising ordinary care 
to ascertain the source of a product to rely much more on 
packaging, trademarks, and advertising, which if not deceptive 
tend to reveal the product's source unambiguously, than on the 
product configuration, which usually does not contain an explicit 
statement of the producer's identity.  While it might be shown 
that consumers in fact rely on a particular product's 
configuration to identify its source, such deviation from the 
normal pattern (i.e, from reliance on trademarks, packaging, and 
advertising) would be rare.  Because clear labeling thus should 
generally be legally and factually sufficient to remedy confusion 
where unpatented product configurations are at issue, clarity of 
labeling (and marketing) must be taken into account in 
considering whether there is a likelihood that consumers 
exercising ordinary care will be confused as to the sources of 
substantially identical products. 
 Much as courts are required to police the boundaries of 
similarity within which a jury may be permitted to find a 
  
likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act, Country Floors, 
Inc., 930 F.2d at 1063, courts must also establish the perimeters 
of ordinary care that constrain likelihood of confusion.  The 
following non-exhaustive considerations should guide a court's 
determination of the standard of ordinary care for a particular 
product.  Inexpensive goods require consumers to exercise less 
care in their selection than expensive ones.  The more important 
the use of a product, the more care that must be exercised in its 
selection.  In addition, "the degree of caution used . . . 
depends on the relevant buying class.  That is, some buyer 
classes, for example, professional buyers . . . will be held to a 
higher standard of care than others.  Where the buyer class 
consists of both professional buyers and consumers, . . . . the 
standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably prudent 
purchaser will be equal to that of the least sophisticated 
consumer in the class."  Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 293. 
  
4.  Actual Confusion or Lack Thereof  (Scott Factors 4 & 6) 
 The fourth Scott factor is "the length of time defendant has 
used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising."  
While we hold that this factor applies to product configuration 
cases as well as to trade mark and product packaging cases (for 
it is obviously relevant), we take this opportunity to underscore 
the role of the "lack of actual confusion" factor.  If a 
defendant's product has been sold for an appreciable period of 
time without evidence of actual confusion, one can infer that 
continued marketing will not lead to consumer confusion in the 
future.  The longer the challenged product has been in use, the 
stronger this inference will be. 
 "Evidence of actual confusion" (the sixth Scott factor 
bearing on likelihood of confusion) is similarly relevant:  the 
more evidence of actual confusion that a plaintiff can muster, 
the stronger the likelihood of confusion in the future, but lack 
of evidence of actual confusion (at least where the time period 
that the two products have been in competition is short or "when 
the particular circumstances [do not] indicate such evidence 
should have been available," AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 
F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979)) does not raise an inference that 
there is no likelihood of confusion.  As the case law makes 
clear, proof of actual confusion is not required for a successful 
trade dress infringement action under the Lanham Act.  Ford Motor 
Co., 930 F.2d at 292 (quoting Opticians Ass'n v. Independent 
  
Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 1990)); accord 2 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:2 (2d ed. 1984); id. § 
23:20. 
 We see no reason that these factors would not also apply to 
product configuration cases.  However, we emphasize again, see 
supra at 35-37, that to make out unfair competition a plaintiff 
must show a likelihood that a consumer exercising ordinary care 
to discover the identity of the source would suffer confusion or 
be mistaken because of the appearance of the allegedly infringing 
product configuration.  Thus, instances of actual confusion may 
not weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion unless 
the confused consumer was acting with the care expected of 
consumers purchasing the type of good at issue.  See G.D. Searle 
& Co. v. Hudson Pharmaceutical Corp., 715 F.2d 837, 840 & n.6 
(1983) (ignoring testimony of witness who "was not acting as a 
reasonably prudent consumer of the type of goods in issue when 
purchasing the product"). 
  
5.  Defendant's Intent  (Scott Factor 5) 
  
 The fifth Scott factor is "the intent of the defendant in 
adopting the mark."  Whatever merit this factor may have in the 
context of trade mark and product packaging trade dress cases, we 
doubt that it is an appropriate consideration in a trade dress 
infringement case where the trade dress is alleged in the product 
configuration itself.  In the likelihood of confusion inquiry in 
trademark cases and product packaging trade dress cases, we do 
not focus on a defendant's bare intent to adopt a mark or product 
packaging substantially identical to a plaintiff's mark or 
packaging, since there is little basis in fact or logic for 
supposing from a defendant's intent to copy (without more) that 
the defendant's actions will in fact result in confusion.  Thus, 
what we have held is that a defendant's intent to confuse or 
deceive consumers as to the product's source may be highly 
probative of likelihood of confusion.  See American Home Prods. 
v. Barr Lab., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1987) (product 
packaging case -- color of pain relief medication); see also 
Fisons Horticulture, Inc., 30 F.3d at 479-80 (identifying "intent 
of promoting confusion and appropriating the prior user's good 
will" as appropriate inquiry in forward confusion cases) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (trademark case -- marks 
"Fairway" and "Fairway Green"); Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. 
Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 960 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he 
defendant's intent is relevant to the issue of likelihood of 
confusion only if he intended to palm off his products as those 
  
of another." (internal quotation marks omitted) (trademark case 
-- words "Thirst Aid" used in advertising campaign); First Brands 
Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1987) 
("Intent of a defendant in adopting his trade dress is a critical 
factor, since if the trade dress were adopted with the intent of 
depriving benefit from the reputation of the plaintiff, that fact 
alone may be sufficient to justify the inference that there is a 
confusing similarity.") (emphasis supplied) (product packaging 
case -- color and shape of antifreeze jug). 
 Because American Home Products involved a claim that the 
color of a rival producer's ibuprofen tablet infringed the trade 
dress of the plaintiff's Advil tablet, we believe that the case 
is closer to a product packaging case than a product 
configuration case.  Even were we to consider it a product 
configuration case, however, American Home Products is consistent 
with our present discussion of defendant's intent.  Judge Seitz's 
opinion did not hold that independent significance must be 
accorded a defendant's mere intent to copy; rather, it held that 
"intent to confuse might be highly probative of likelihood of 
confusion" and that "[a]t most, defendant's intent is a factor 
tending to suggest likelihood of confusion."  American Home 
Prods., Inc., 834 F.2d at 371 (emphases supplied).  In what 
follows, we simply clarify this circuit's intent-to-confuse rule 
for product configuration cases, delineating the circumstances 
under which a defendant's intent to confuse or deceive consumers 
  
may be considered a factor in the likelihood of confusion 
inquiry. 
  We realize that some courts have adopted a broader rule 
holding that a defendant's intent to copy strongly supports an 
inference of likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., Bauer Lamp Co. 
v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1172 (11th Cir. 1991); Mobil Oil Corp. 
v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1987).  
Like the intent-to-confuse rule, this intent-to-copy rule relies 
essentially on a (rebuttable) presumption of efficacy -- although 
the intent-to-copy rule requires a double inference, see, e.g., 
Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 
(2d Cir. 1980) ("If there was intentional copying the second 
comer will be presumed to have intended to create a confusing 
similarity of appearance and will be presumed to have 
succeeded.") -- since the defendant's intent standing alone 
(without reference to the defendant's competence and the nature 
of the defendant's actions) reveals little about the probable 
outcome of the defendant's conduct.14 
                     
    
14
.    Thus we must disagree with one commentary, which, 
relying on case law (but not attempting to defend or explain its 
assertion), states:  "Once intent to benefit or capitalize under 
Section 43(a) is found, the presumption or inference of 
likelihood of confusion logically ensues."  MCKENNEY & LONG, FEDERAL 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3.08[11][c] (emphasis supplied).  Indeed, we 
note that this treatise contains a passage that, at least when 
generalized, illustrates the fallacy of the intent presumption:  
"the fact of likelihood of confusion [or lack thereof] among 
members of the relevant trade and purchasing public may be 
discerned by a court even if a defendant intended to realize a 
contrary result."  Id. § 3.08[11][a]. 
  
 The justification for these inferences in a trade mark or 
product packaging case is that there is little or no competitive 
need to copy another's distinctive symbol or presentation to sell 
one's product, and that anyone who does so is most likely trying 
to cash in on the competitor's good will attached to the 
competitor's mark or packaging in order to sell his or her own 
product.  See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 23.33 ("[W]e can readily read into defendant's choice of a 
confusingly similar mark the intent to get a free ride upon the 
reputation of a well known mark.").  This presumption largely 
duplicates the weight given to the substantial-identity-of-
appearance factor (Scott factor 1) in the likelihood of confusion 
inquiry, and the extra weight assigned to the intent to deceive 
is somewhat punitive.  Cf. 2 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 23.32 ("Where there is hard evidence of defendant's intention 
to get a free ride on plaintiff's reputation, the court is free 
to engage in the traditional rhetoric which accompanies punishing 
the evildoer[.]"). 
 Although these two types of inference from defendant's 
intent do not directly serve the purpose of preventing consumer 
confusion or misappropriation of a producer's good will -- either 
of which might arise from good faith or bad faith actions -- the 
inferences may serve as a deterrent to infringement.  But where 
product configurations are concerned, we believe there is little 
  
room for deterrence if appropriate labeling and marketing are 
undertaken. 
 One primary purpose of the Lanham Act is to foster fair 
competition.  See, e.g., Merchant & Evans, Inc., 963 F.2d at 640 
n.13 (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 
U.S. 189, 193, 105 S. Ct. 658, 661 (1985), and Jay Dratler, Jr., 
Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 
887, 926 n.10).  Indeed, we have said that prevention of unfair 
competition is the doctrinal basis for trade dress infringement 
suits under the Act.  American Greetings Corp., Inc., 807 F.2d at 
1140-41 & n.2.  Where product configurations are concerned, we 
must be especially wary of undermining competition.  Competitors 
have broad rights to copy successful product designs when those 
designs are not protected by (utility or design) patents.  It is 
not unfair competition for someone to trade off the goodwill of a 
product, see Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 
121, 59 S. Ct. 109, 115 (1938); it is only unfair to deceive 
consumers as to the origin of one's goods and thereby trade off 
the good will of a prior producer.  See also Duraco, 40 F.3d at 
1445. 
 Unless very narrowly tailored, deterrents to copying of 
product designs -- as opposed to product packaging or trademarks 
-- would inhibit even fair competition, thus distorting the 
Lanham Act's purpose.  We believe that the best way to further 
Congress's intent is to limit carefully the scope of any possible 
  
deterrence of competition.  Cf. Merchant & Evans, Inc., 963 F.2d 
at 640 ("[C]ourts should tailor trademark remedies to decrease 
the likelihood of confusion without unnecessarily inhibiting 
competition.").  Recognizing that trade mark and trade dress 
cases on one hand and patent cases on the other do not involve 
identical considerations, we nevertheless turn for guidance in 
this task to patent cases concerning defendants' intent, for, as 
we have noted, we must decide product configuration cases so as 
harmonize with the federal patent laws.  See supra at Error! 
Bookmark not defined.-36. 
 In patent infringement cases, a defendant's bad intent is 
relevant in at least two contexts.  First, under the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct, infringement claims may be rendered 
unenforceable if a plaintiff intended to deceive the Patent 
Office by failing to disclose material evidence.  See, e.g., 
Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 975 F.2d 815, 822 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992); Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 839 F.2d 
1556, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  Second, a plaintiff may receive 
increased damages where a defendant willfully infringed its 
patent.  See, e.g., Braun, Inc., 975 F.2d at 822; E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1440 
(Fed. Cir. 1988).  In either case, however, the plaintiff must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had the 
relevant bad intent.  See, e.g., Braun, Inc., 975 F.2d at 822 
(intent to deceive Patent Office and willful infringement); Allen 
  
Organ Co., 839 F.2d at 1567 (intent to deceive Patent Office); 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 849 F.2d at 1440 (willful 
infringement).  Although in the present context we are not 
dealing with increased damages or actions taken by the Patent 
Office, product configuration trade dress cases nonetheless 
implicate patent-like restrictions on competition.  Like the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct, a heightened evidentiary 
standard would serve to ensure that deviations from the "the 
federal policy . . . of allowing free access to copy whatever the 
federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain," 
Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237, 84 S. Ct. at 782, are not casually 
countenanced.  And much as the burden of proof for willful 
infringement assures that competitors are not penalized by 
increased damage awards without compelling evidence, we think it 
similarly important to competitors -- as well as the public -- 
that competition not be hobbled by monetary damages or injunctive 
prohibitions absent similarly compelling evidence. 
 Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we hold that in 
the product configuration context, a defendant's intent weighs in 
favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion only if intent to 
confuse or deceive is demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence, and only where the product's labeling and marketing are 
also affirmatively misleading.  Of course, a plaintiff might 
succeed in proving likelihood of confusion without evidence of 
affirmative deception.  We only hold that, to be considered as 
  
evidence of a likelihood of confusion in a product configuration 
case, the defendant's intent must meet the conditions we have set 
forth. 
6.  Marketing Considerations  (Scott Factors 7-10) 
 The remaining factors identified by Scott as bearing on the 
likelihood of confusion address various aspects of the marketing 
of the products.  In the product configuration context, none of 
these four factors tends to establish a probability of confusion, 
rather than a mere possibility, and thus we conclude that they 
should be treated as necessary but insufficient conditions for 
showing a likelihood of confusion. 
 The seventh Scott factor is "whether the goods, though not 
competing, are marketed through the same channels of trade and 
advertised through the same media."  We believe that this factor, 
which is explicitly formulated for application to non-competing 
products, serves primarily to establish the possibility of 
confusion and carries little weight toward establishing the 
probability of confusion; if not shown, it may exonerate a 
defendant, but if established, it merely allows the plaintiff's 
case to go forward.  Moreover, it will rarely need to be 
considered in a product configuration trade dress infringement 
case, for the goods at issue will almost by definition be in 
competition. 
 "The extent to which the targets of the parties' sale 
efforts are the same" is the eighth Scott factor.  Like the 
  
marketing channel inquiry, this factor was developed largely for 
non-competing products, see, e.g., Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 
721 F.2d 460, 462-63 (3d Cir. 1983); Scott Paper Co., 589 F.2d at 
1229-30, and relates more to the possibility than the probability 
of confusion.  Particularly in a product configuration case, this 
factor should be considered necessary but not sufficient:  If 
different consumers buy the defendant's product and the 
plaintiff's product, the defendant will typically win; if 
substantially overlapping audiences buy the products, the 
plaintiff does not automatically win, but will usually have the 
opportunity to further develop its case for likelihood of 
confusion. 
 "The relationship of the goods in the minds of the public 
because of the similarity of function" and "other facts 
suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner 
to manufacture a product in the defendant's market" are the ninth 
and tenth Scott factors for determining likelihood of confusion.  
Bearing in mind that these factors also were developed for non-
competing products, we believe that they are largely superfluous 
in product configuration cases.  The requisite similarity of 
trade dress in the product designs themselves would in most cases 
presuppose a similarity of function between the products at 
issue.  Hence, some measure of so-called "competitive proximity" 
will always be present in product configuration trade dress 
infringement cases and therefore, while a necessary condition for 
  
there to be a likelihood of confusion, this factor is not a 
sufficient condition, nor does it by itself create a strong 
presumption that confusion is likely to ensue. 
 C.  The Balance of the Modified Scott Factors Here 
 In this case, "[t]he dispositive issue is . . . consumer 
confusion as to source.  Regardless of how much secondary meaning 
it possesses, a product's trade dress will not be protected from 
an imitator that is sufficiently different in its features to 
avoid such confusion."  Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor 
Co., 731 F.2d at 151.  For the reasons we explained above, we 
believe that the district court committed legal error in 
initially applying a "possibility of confusion" standard, and, 
applying the (modified) Scott factors, we conclude that it 
clearly erred in inferring from the evidence and testimony that 
an appreciable number of buyers are likely to be confused as to 
the origin of Bifold's Domino Junior valve.  See CL 55, 62, 64. 
1.  The Governing Standard:  Likelihood of Confusion 
 The district court held that 
 [a] lower standard for "likelihood of confusion" is applied 
where a newcomer to an area already occupied by a long 
established entity is the alleged violator.  The Third 
Circuit uses the phrase "possibility of confusion" to 
describe this standard. 
CL 56 (citations omitted).  As we explained above, see supra at 
23-28, this standard is inapplicable in product configuration 
cases.  We decline, however, to reverse on this basis. 
 Although the district court announced the "possibility of 
confusion" standard in its Conclusions of Law, it appears that 
  
the court might not have relied on the lowered threshold in 
finding for the plaintiff.  None of the other "Conclusions" 
bearing on the issue of confusion included the "possibility" 
language; those that mentioned any measure used "likelihood" of 
confusion, the correct standard.  Accordingly, in an excess of 
caution, we treat Conclusion of Law 56 as surplusage, and review 
the judgment for clear error with respect to the conclusion that 
Bifold's actions present a likelihood of confusion, Ciba-Geigy 
Corp., 747 F.2d at 851.  We apply the Scott factors as modified, 
see supra Section II.B. 
2.  Viability of the District Court's Similarity Fact Finding 
 The district court correctly identified the similarity of 
product appearances (Scott factor 1) as the threshold inquiry in 
ascertaining likelihood of confusion.  However, it improperly 
imported the trade mark/product packaging standard for the weight 
to be assigned this factor, holding that "if the overall 
impression created by the trade dress is essentially the same, it 
is very probable that the products are confusingly similar."  
From there, it apparently reasoned that because "[t]he overall 
appearance of the Versa B-316 valve and the Bifold Domino Junior 
valve is virtually identical[,] there is a likelihood of 
confusion."  See also CL 64 ("Bifold Domino Junior valves have a 
very similar appearance to Versa B-316 valves; there is a 
likelihood of confusion."). 
  
 Despite the appreciable differences between the valves' 
appearances, see supra at 10-11, we do not hold the district 
court's finding of similarity of appearance to be clearly 
erroneous.  But in a product configuration case, the similarity 
of the product designs does not alone give rise to a strong 
inference of likelihood of confusion, see supra at 30-32, since 
the greatest weight must be given to the primary means by which 
consumers identify the products' sources:  packaging, trademarks, 
and advertising.  Accordingly, the similar appearance of the two 
valves' designs allows Versa to argue -- but does not establish 
-- a likelihood of confusion.  The district court's findings 
concerning the trade channels and advertising media used by 
Bifold and Versa (Scott factor 7) and Bifold's targeting of the 
same customer group (Scott factor 8) similarly do little to 
establish likelihood of confusion. 
  
3.  Intent, Competitive Proximity, and Likelihood of Confusion 
 Compounding its error regarding the effect of the similarity 
of the valves' appearances, the court asserted that "[a]n intent 
to copy trade dress and/or finding of copying by a junior user is 
often alone dispositive of a finding of likelihood of confusion."  
Even as concerns trade marks and product packaging, however, only 
an intent to deceive or confuse consumers can suffice to raise a 
presumption of likelihood of confusion in this circuit.  See 
supra at 41.  Moreover, in a product configuration case the 
defendant's intent (Scott factor 5) is not relevant to the issue 
of likelihood of confusion absent affirmatively misleading 
labeling and marketing.  Here, Bifold's identification of its 
Domino Junior valves is by no means misleading, see supra at 11; 
infra at Error! Bookmark not defined.-65, and thus Bifold's 
intent should not be considered. 
 Similarly, the district court erred in holding that "[w]hen 
products are used in the same application, such a competitive 
proximity of goods strongly favors a finding of likelihood of 
confusion" (emphasis supplied).  This proposition finds no 
support in the two decisions of this court cited by the district 
court, see Interpace Corp., 721 F.2d at 462; Scott Paper, 589 
F.2d at 1229, and at all events it is not applicable where trade 
dress consists in a product configuration, as our previous 
discussion explains.  See supra at Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
  
4.  Strength of the Trade Dress and Likelihood of Confusion 
 Turning to the Scott factors that are relevant to the 
likelihood of confusion in this product configuration case, we 
first note that the "strength" of Versa's trade dress in its B-
316 valves' configuration (Scott factor 2) may not support a 
conclusion of likelihood of confusion because there is no 
evidence that consumers rely on the appearance of the B-316 valve 
to identify it.  See supra at 33-34.  To the contrary, all the 
evidence shows that consumers order valves by multi-digit part 
and model numbers peculiar to the manufacturer.  In selecting the 
valves buyers do not specify the desired appearance but rather 
designate functional specifications listed in schematic diagrams, 
specification sheets, and manufacturers' catalogues.  Such 
precision in ordering is necessary, for Versa offers many 
variations of its valves.  Thus, the "strength" of the B-316's 
trade dress does not bolster Versa's case for a likelihood of 
confusion. 
  
5.  The Evidentiary Role of Actual Confusion 
 This brings us to evidence of actual confusion (Scott 
factor 6) or the lack thereof (Scott factor 4).  The district 
court correctly noted that Versa need not prove actual confusion, 
only a likelihood of confusion.  Although the district court did 
not address the pertinent evidence in its Conclusions of Law or 
explicitly rely there on evidence of actual confusion, we will 
address the Findings of Fact arguably relevant to actual 
confusion that might support the district court's conclusion of 
likelihood of confusion.  Our examination confirms that the 
district court's ultimate conclusion was clearly erroneous, not 
supported by record evidence, let alone evidence cited anywhere 
in the opinion. 
  
 a.  Carr's Involvement Reflects No Actual or Likely 
Confusion 
 The district court commenced the "Likelihood of Confusion" 
section of its Findings of Fact by discussing Bifold's "sole 
sales representative in the United States."  The court found (and 
there is record evidence to support) that Bifold hired James 
Carr, III, a former Versa regional marketing manager; that Carr 
has already tried to sell Bifold products to Gordon Fraleigh, a 
Versa distributor who knew Carr for a number of years while Carr 
was a regional sales manager for Versa; and that Carr told 
Fraleigh that the Bifold valve was an "exact copy" of the Versa 
B-316, as a result of which there was confusion in Fraleigh's 
(heightened by Carr's former relationship with Versa) mind as to 
the relationship between Versa and Bifold. 
 This depiction of the facts, however, is misleading.  It 
presents only a snapshot of Fraleigh's mental processes, taken 
from a particular angle at a single instant in time.  Examining 
Fraleigh's uncontested testimony from a different angle reveals 
the situation more fully:  First, the telephone call in question 
occurred sometime around the early part of 1993, but Fraleigh 
knew that Carr left Versa's employ in 1990.  Thus, at the time of 
this call, Fraleigh knew Carr was not with Versa; indeed, during 
the call, Carr told Fraleigh that he was with Bifold, an English 
company, and he did not say that Bifold was connected with Versa 
or that its valves were made by Versa.  Second, Fraleigh's 
employer, the Fraleigh Company, distributes the products of about 
  
seventy companies, including Versa, and before the call in 
question Carr had phoned Fraleigh representing various non-Bifold 
product lines competitive with Versa.  Fraleigh was apparently 
confused only because he had not previously seen duplicate 
products in the fluid power industry and because Carr had once 
been a Versa representative. 
 Moreover, a slightly broadened temporal focus exposes the 
manifest error in the district court's fact finding.  Initially, 
we note that Fraleigh's testimony reveals that he did not even 
know whether Carr was referring to Bifold's Domino Junior valve.  
Nor did Fraleigh see the valve, for he and Carr conversed by 
telephone.  Fraleigh's testimony, then, cannot be evidence that 
the appearance of the Domino Junior was so like Versa's trade 
dress that it would confuse consumers as to the sources of the 
valves.  Furthermore, Fraleigh testified that, because of his 
confusion, he called Versa Products to find out what was going 
on.  Versa's sales manager, Joe Sudol, explained that Bifold was 
a competing company from England that had copied the B-316.  
Indeed, he asked Fraleigh to try to get information on Bifold's 
valve. 
 Plainly, then, Fraleigh's testimony does not represent an 
instance of "actual confusion."  It reflects only fleeting 
uncertainty as to the relationship between Bifold and Versa, not 
a mistaken belief that there was any affiliation between the two 
companies.  Fraleigh was able with minimal effort to procure the 
  
modicum of information he needed to dispel his uncertainty.15  We 
believe that Fraleigh acted as a prudent distributor-customer of 
these sorts of valves, and as a result was not confused in the 
Lanham Act sense.16 
                     
    
15
.    In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is also 
most likely that Carr himself would have told Fraleigh the truth 
-- that Bifold is an unaffiliated competitor of Versa -- had 
Fraleigh asked.  Courts may not simply presume that individuals 
will lie in direct violation of trademark and unfair competition 
laws.  Indeed, Versa's counsel conceded that "I'm not and cannot 
offer to this Court that we have proof of a distributor that has 
done that [i.e., falsely indicated that Bifold is associated with 
Versa's products]."  Nor did Versa even offer other instances in 
this industry where such misrepresentation had occurred.  (Versa 
Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer Frank Vetter opined 
only that "it becomes very easy for a Bifold perhaps distributor 
[sic] to go in and, as you might hear later on in testimony, 
[say] that this valve is a direct interchange with a Versa valve, 
it fits in the same place, it performs the same function."  This 
is a far cry from evidence that distributors mispresent the 
sources of the valves they sell.  The district court therefore 
correctly characterized such testimony as "highly speculative," 
and Versa's expert witness Gerald Murphy as not qualified to 
"opine as to whether somebody's going to lie or not." 
 Pharmaceutical cases relying on possible substitution of one 
maker's drug for another by pharmacists filling prescriptions are 
not to the contrary.  In such cases, the finding of likelihood of 
confusion is supported by evidence that improper substitution 
commonly occurs in prescription filling, and that the minuscule 
markings on pills with similar trade dress are sufficiently 
difficult to read by many customers that the markings do not 
reduce the likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., SK&F, Co., 625 
F.2d at 1059 & n.2, 1061. 
    
16
.    Thus, aside from its bearing on the channels of trade 
and target audiences, see supra at 48-49, evidence that Carr has 
still been able to get access to Versa valve products and has 
recently sold Versa valves to the same customers to whom he will 
be selling Bifold valves is irrelevant to likelihood of 
confusion. 
  
 b.  The Wentworth Fax Reflects No Actual Confusion 
 Second, the district court asserted that at least one 
customer has forwarded to Bifold a telefax that was initially 
addressed to Versa.  The fax from Trevor Wentworth opened with 
the following statement:  " Derek reference our telecon this 
morning here are the requirements for the above referenced 
project."  The original addressee was Versa, "Attention:  Dave," 
and after those names were crossed out, the same fax was sent to 
Bifold, "Attention:  Derek Close"; the fax number -- "Auto" -- 
was unchanged.  But this fax may have been a request for 
competitive bids,17 including only Versa's part numbers because 
Wentworth had spoken to Bifold's sales representative by 
telephone and had not yet been sent any spec sheets; or (although 
unlikely) it might reflect a customer so befuddled that he could 
not remember to whom he had spoken that morning, and thus not a 
customer exercising ordinary care.  At all events, there is no 
evidence that the customer had even seen the appearance of 
Bifold's Domino Junior valve to be able to confuse it with 
Versa's trade dress on its B-316 valve.  For these reasons, and 
because there was no testimony at trial concerning this 
unexplained fax, the district court clearly erred when it used 
this evidence to buttress its conclusion that there was confusion 
-- actual or likely -- as to the sources of the valves or the 
relationship (or lack thereof) between Versa and Bifold.18 
                     
    
17
.    Bifold explains on appeal, and Versa does not contest, 
that the fax "was a request for a price quote, and the customer 
  
 c.  The Hearsay Evidence Constitutes No Evidence of 
Confusion 
(..continued) 
was seeking competitive bids."  Br. of Appellant, at 38.  We do 
not, however, determine that this explanation is true; rather, we 
cite it only as a possibility.  There was no explanation offered 
at trial, for the district court at the outset admitted (without 
discussion) all documentary evidence appearing on a list prepared 
by either party and not objected to. 
    
18
.    Since the fax referred to B-series and V-series valves 
and was sent initially to Versa, we believe that the competitive 
bid explanation is the only plausible one in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary.  By contrast, a fax sent initially to 
Versa but asking for a quote on Domino Junior valves would 
suggest confusion. 
  
 Third, the district court erred in relying on hearsay 
evidence for the proposition that there was actual confusion.  
The district court recorded as a finding of fact that "When Mr. 
Frank Vetter was asked by Bifold's attorney for examples of 
actual confusion between Bifold's Domino Junior valve and Versa's 
B-316 valve, Mr. Vetter related that he had been advised of 
confusion at trade shows."  We agree that the record reflects 
Vetter's response.  But his answer is pure hearsay:  Vetter's 
testimony upon which the district court relied was that "I have 
been advised by our sales manager in Europe that there was 
confusion at trade shows, that people had indicated that the 
valves resembled, were identical and they would lead to 
confusion."  Vetter could not even identify the people allegedly 
confused, instead referring Bifold's attorney to "the brief."  
Moreover, Vetter's response only proves that people thought the 
valves' appearances were similar, not that they were actually 
confused by the similar appearances.  In this light, even if 
Vetter's testimony were not hearsay, it still would not 
demonstrate confusion as to the sources of the valves engendered 
by the similarity in appearance of the valves. 
 The district court similarly erred in making a finding of 
fact that "Hans Albert, Sales Manager for Versa, B.V., 
substantiated that he had discussions with people at the 
Stavanger, Norway trade show regarding the issue of confusion, 
including Mr. Ellingston of Hark & Ellingston, a major competitor 
  
in Norway[,] and Mr. Ungerskruge, an employee of a company named 
Holter that manufacture[s] wellhead control panels."  Again, this 
testimony is hearsay, to which Bifold objected.  Versa then 
offered it solely to prove that Alberts had a conversation with 
two identifiable people, and the district court ruled that 
Albert's testimony must not concern the substance of the 
conversation.  Accordingly, this testimony has no bearing on the 
issue of the likelihood of consumer confusion as to the sources 
of the valves, and it was therefore error for the district court 
to include it as the basis for a finding of fact.  Even were the 
substance of the testimony admissible, Vetter testified only that 
he spoke with people "with regard to the issue of confusion."  
Thus, the testimony is not probative of a likelihood of confusion 
as to source as a result of the alleged trade dress infringement. 
  
 d.  Summary Concerning Actual Confusion 
 In sum, we believe that there was no evidence of actual 
consumer confusion as to source upon which the district court 
could have relied to find a likelihood of confusion.  Moreover, 
as the district court found, "[o]nly two Domino Junior valves 
have been sold to date in the United States and those have been 
sold to Versa's sales representative so that there has been 
little, if any, opportunity to develop evidence of further 
confusion in the United States."  Accordingly, evidence of actual 
confusion or lack thereof does not weigh in favor of or against a 
finding of likelihood of confusion.  We turn to the final 
relevant Scott factor. 
6.  Labeling, Care Expected of Consumers, and Likelihood of 
Confusion 
 As noted above, the third Scott factor is "the price of the 
goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention 
expected of consumers when making a purchase."  As we have 
described, this factor is fundamental in product configuration 
cases, where the most important facts are the marketing and 
labeling of the similarly configured products.  As we now 
explain, the district court clearly erred in not finding these 
factors dispositive in this case. 
 The district court was technically correct in stating that 
"[t]he fact that the source of the product is clearly designated 
on the product does not establish that plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate a likelihood of confusion as such an element is 
  
simply one factor to be assessed when resolving the confusion 
issue."  However, it failed to appreciate the converse 
proposition, that a court need not consider all these elements 
when some are dispositive.  See Freixenet, S.A., 731 F.2d at 
151-52.  Here, as the court properly observed, "[i]n selling a 
competing valve, Bifold's duty is to take reasonable steps to 
prevent deception."  Under the circumstances, Bifold more than 
adequately met its duty to take reasonable steps to prevent 
deception. 
 a.  Bifold's Extensive Labeling Precludes Likelihood of 
Confusion 
 Although the configurations of Versa's B-316 and Bifold's 
Domino Junior valves are quite similar in appearance, we deal 
here with a product configuration case, and thus the labeling of 
the products takes on a heightened importance.  See supra at 
Error! Bookmark not defined.-32.  The facts found by the district 
court clearly show that Bifold took entirely reasonable and 
adequate steps to prevent confusion. 
 The district court found that "[t]he name VERSA and the 
place of origin, `N.J., U.S.A.,' are cast into the metal [of the 
B-316 valve body] to identify Versa as the valve's source."  
Moreover, "[e]very valve body that Versa sells bears a label 
displaying the VERSA name, logo and part number."  Similarly, the 
court noted that "Bifold casts its name into the DOMINO JUNIOR 
valve body, and bolts onto the body a metal label displaying the 
BIFOLD name." 
  
 But this brief recitation fails to convey the adequacy of 
Bifold's efforts.  "In the case of a relatively high-priced, 
single-purchase article, . . . there is hardly likelihood of 
confusion or palming off when the name of the manufacturer is 
clearly displayed."  Merchant & Evans, Inc., 963 F.2d at 636 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bose Corp., 467 F.2d 
at 310 (same).  Here, the metal label bolted onto the Domino 
Junior valves does more than "display[] the BIFOLD name."  The 
name appears in a logo of sorts in a font markedly different from 
that used in the Versa logo.  The label also contains Bifold's 
part number and a valve serial number, the place of origin 
(Wigan, England), Bifold's telephone number, and its fax number.  
Moreover, this is not a case where "[t]he items are relatively 
inexpensive and consumers cannot be expected to examine the 
labels carefully," Scott Paper Co., 589 F.2d at 1230, and even a 
quick glance at the permanently affixed label reveals that Bifold 
is the source of the Domino Junior valve. Thus, Bifold's labeling 
will suffice to dispel any confusion about the valve's source 
that the configuration of the Domino Junior valve might otherwise 
engender in purchasers who exercise ordinary care. 
 b.  The Manner in Which the Valves Are Sold Virtually 
Precludes Likelihood of Confusion 
 In addition to the clear labeling, the manner in which the 
valves are marketed further nullifies any likelihood of 
confusion.  As the district court found: 
 The Versa B-316 and Bifold DOMINO JUNIOR valves are not sold 
on a shelf or selected on sight.  Buyers order the valves 
  
based on functional specifications as shown on schematic 
diagrams, manufacturer's catalogs or specification sheets 
and samples available at trade shows and sales 
presentations. 
Moreover, purchasers cannot buy Versa B-316 or Bifold Domino 
Junior valves by name only.  B-316 valves can be purchased only 
by specifying a multi-digit part number pursuant to Versa's 
comprehensive part numbering system.  Similarly, Bifold requires 
the use of its own part numbering system, with the numbers 
obtainable only by reference to a Bifold specification sheet.  
Finally, as the district court also found, "[t]he purchasers and 
users of Versa's B-316 valves are qualified, knowledgeable 
personnel who understand how the valves are to be installed and 
operated." 
 The appearance of these valves simply plays no role in the 
ordering process, which instead requires the use of detailed 
technical specifications and lengthy, manufactuer-specific part 
numbers.  Under these circumstances, we find it utterly 
inconceivable that one of -- let alone an appreciable number of 
-- the professional buyers of these valves will be confused, by 
the appearance of the Domino Junior, as to the valves' 
manufacturers or the relationship between them. 
 c.  Summary of the Labeling and Care Expected of Consumers 
 The foregoing evidence must be viewed as virtually 
precluding any likelihood of confusion.  These valves are not 
bought by children or casual consumers, nor are they purchased 
solely by name.  There is no likelihood of confusion -- indeed, 
  
virtually no possibility that the appearance of the Bifold Domino 
Junior valve body will mislead purchasers into thinking that they 
are ordering a Domino Junior valve from Versa or a B-316 valve 
from Bifold, and the enormous safety concerns surrounding the 
applications where these valves are used increase the already 
great care used by purchasers of these valves.19  Typically, they 
are found in offshore oil drilling control applications, 
hazardous and demanding environments where loss of human life, 
major environmental damage (and consequent liability), and huge 
property loss may be at stake if a valve does not function 
properly in an emergency shutdown.  Because of the dire 
consequences of using an improper valve, engineers who design the 
control panels would be expected to exercise a high degree of 
caution in selecting valves, and thus would be highly unlikely to 
mistake a Versa B-316 for a Bifold Domino Junior. 
 Therefore, in light of the importance of the valves, the 
process by which they are purchased, the sophistication of the 
consumers, and the clarity of Bifold's labeling, there is no 
likelihood (or even a realistic possibility) of consumer 
confusion as to the source of Versa's or Bifold's valves, and we 
                     
    
19
.    Although Versa intended its witnesses' testimony to 
highlight the hazards of confusing a Versa valve with a Bifold 
valve -- which would be product confusion, not source confusion 
as required for a Lanham Act violation -- the testimony is 
nonetheless indicative of the care that ordinarily prudent valve 
consumers may be expected to use. 
  
conclude that the district court's contrary finding was clearly 
erroneous.  
7.  Private Labeling Theories Do Not Support Likelihood of 
Confusion 
 We must still address one additional theory under which the 
district court found a likelihood of confusion:  the private 
labeling theory.  The district court concluded, ostensibly as a 
finding of fact, that 
 [g]iven the virtual identity in appearance of the Versa B-
316 cast valve and the Bifold DOMINO JUNIOR cast valve and 
the fact that Bifold has not previously sold products in the 
United States, anyone in the industry might reasonably 
assume that Versa had manufactured but privately labelled 
the Bifold DOMINO JUNIOR valve or that the DOMINO JUNIOR 
valve is otherwise associated with Versa. 
FF 232.   The court further concluded that 
 [t]he 'second comer" Bifold DOMINO JUNIOR valve looks so 
similar to the established Versa B-316 valve that it looks 
like a private label manufactured by Versa.  The two valves 
could be confused; consumers would think that there is some 
relationship between the two valves and two companies. 
FF 233 (citations omitted).  Although we believe that these 
conclusions present mixed questions of fact and law, for the 
district court focused upon what consumers might "reasonably" 
assume, we need not invoke plenary review, for we are firmly 
convinced that they represent clear error, and that the theory of 
confusion in which they are grounded does not support a claim 
under the Lanham Act or New Jersey law. 
 In FF 232, the district court concluded from coincidence of 
similarity of appearance and recency of entry into a market that 
  
consumers might reasonably assume private labelling or some other 
relationship between the Domino Junior and Versa valves.  The 
district court is correct that the Lanham Act protects against 
confusion not only as to source but also as to connection between 
manufacturers of similar products.  See, e.g., Institute for 
Scientific Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, 
Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1991).  But the court's 
inference would potentially subject any new competitor with a 
product whose appearance resembles that of an established product  
to an injunction on this private labeling theory.  We have simply 
been presented with no evidence that "private labeling" occurs 
today on a scale significant enough to justify such a sweeping 
extension of the law of unfair competition. 
 Even a presumption of more limited scope would not support 
the district court's inference.  Where product configurations are 
at issue, consumers are not generally likely to jump to the 
"private labeling" conclusion; consider for example Oreo and 
Hydrox brand sandwich cookies, which are strikingly similar in 
appearance.  Consumers would not have assumed upon later 
emergence of one brand that the first producer had marketed a 
slight variation of its cookie under a private label.  Rather, as 
in situations like the present one, consumers generally are more 
likely to conclude, quite reasonably, that a competitor has 
entered the market with a substantially identical product. 
  
 Second, the record evidence does not support the district 
court's conclusion.  Versa's counsel's opening statement at trial 
fairly summarized the content of Gerald Murphy's testimony, which 
formed the sole evidentiary basis for the district court's 
private labeling conclusion: 
 Mr. Murphy [Versa's expert witness] will also tell that as a 
result of his experience, look-alike products are naturally 
associated by way of operating characteristics and 
reputation.  Just because the valves look alike, the Bifold 
Domino Junior valve will command attention from sales 
representatives and others that it would not otherwise 
obtain.  That it will get sales opportunities from people in 
this industry that otherwise would not be available to the 
Bifold Domino Junior product, except for the fact that the 
Bifold Domino Junior product looks exactly like the Versa B-
316 product and is then able to trade off the reputation of 
the Versa B-316 product. 
What Versa and the district court have failed to come to grips 
with is the precept that "[e]xploiting the `goodwill of the 
article,' Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 121, 59 S. Ct. at 115 -- the 
attractive features, of whatever nature, that the product holds 
for consumers -- is robust competition; only deceiving consumers, 
or exploiting the good will of another producer, is unfair 
competition."  Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1445 (one emphasis omitted).  
Moreover, and most importantly, all of Murphy's non-speculative 
testimony supported (as Versa said in its opening) a finding of 
exploitation of the goodwill of, at most, the Versa B-316 
product, not the Versa identification itself. 
 Murphy testified about past situations where misfortunes 
involving valves of one producer led to sales difficulties for 
other manufacturers of similar valves.  He did not testify about 
  
incidents where one producer copied another's trade dress, but 
rather about instances where negative perceptions associated with 
a particular type of valve were transferred to valves of the same 
type made by other manufacturers.  Thus, his testimony showed the 
possibility of the ill will of one valve's diminishing the good 
will of a similar valve.  But even had Murphy testified that the 
valves he was discussing had confusingly similar trade dress -- 
which he did not -- that would not suffice to show that consumers 
abandoned the type of valve that had manifested defects because 
they thought all valves of that type came from related sources.  
Rather, consumer may have abandoned the valves because they 
assumed that all valves of a similar type shared "operating 
characteristics." 
 It is true that in Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 
F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit relied in part on a private labeling theory to uphold a 
finding of likelihood of confusion in a trade dress infringement 
suit by a water meter manufacturer against a competitor who 
copied the appearance of one line of meters.  There, however, the 
defendant was known within the relevant market to have previously 
sold water meters of another manufacturer under its own label.  
Id. at 1152.  Here, in contrast, there is no evidence that Bifold 
is known in the American market as having a history of selling 
other valve manufacturers' products under its own label.  Thus 
Versa may not rely on the inference that consumers familiar with 
  
an established defendant with a known history of private labeling 
will assume that it is selling an established plaintiff's product 
under a private label agreement. 
 Unable to avail itself of the Badger Meter inference, Versa 
attempts to ensnare Bifold by arguing that because Bifold is not 
yet known in the American market, valve purchasers may assume 
that Versa has manufactured the Domino Junior but is selling it 
under a private label.  A rule sanctioning this inference would 
tend to strangle competition by adopting what is in essence a 
presumption that consumers will believe an established business 
has a greater market share than it really does.  The district 
court's conclusion that "anyone in the industry might reasonably 
assume that Versa had manufactured but privately labelled the 
Bifold DOMINO JUNIOR valve or that the DOMINO JUNIOR valve is 
otherwise associated with Versa," represents a dramatic extension 
of the law of unfair competition, one which we cannot believe 
that Congress intended or that New Jersey would adopt. 
 We doubt that a company truly concerned about the quality of 
its valves and its putatively distinctive product configuration 
would use private labeling.  The use of private labeling 
undermines a claim that a product's appearance denotes its 
source, because consumers will be less likely to associate the 
multifariously labeled product with a single source.  See, e.g., 
Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 23 U.SP.Q.2d 1184, 1190-91 (S.D. 
Iowa 1992), and cases cited therein.  And if Versa were to 
  
contend that all the purchasers know that in fact Versa 
manufactures the valves identified by a private label, we are not 
certain what the private labelling would accomplish.  Moreover, 
it would seem that any manufacturer employing private labeling 
for its product necessarily exercises control over that practice, 
and if it is the plaintiff's actions that cause the confusion, 
the plaintiff will not be heard to complain.  Cf. Weil Ceramics & 
Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 676 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, 
J., concurring) ("[The plaintiff] has in effect engineered the 
possibility of a likelihood of confusion and therefore 
infringement in this case.  This is not the sort of injury 
trademark infringement actions under the Lanham Act were intented 
to remedy.").  We decline to establish a rule that would allow a 
plaintiff to expand its own rights by using private labeling to 
assure a design monopoly even despite adequate labeling by 
competitors. 
 We have explained elsewhere that "the primary concern 
[behind the trademark act] was to protect consumers and trademark 
holders from spurious imitations."  Id. at 673 (Higginbotham, J., 
for the court).  Where, as here, a second comer has taken steps 
to conspicuously label its product (however similar to that of an 
established manufacturer), the newcomer has hardly represented 
its product to be that of its competitor, and so has not offered 
a "spurious imitation."  Thus, even if there were evidence that 
Versa uses private labeling, we do not believe that it could form 
  
the basis for a finding of likelihood of confusion.  As it is, 
however, there is absolutely no evidence that Versa or any other 
competitor of Bifold's in the offshore oil well industry uses 
private labeling.  Accordingly, the district court clearly erred 
when it accepted Versa's argument that Bifold's labeling will not 
prevent consumer confusion.20 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 To have prevailed in its action for trade dress 
infringement, Versa needed to show the existence of a likelihood 
that an appreciable number of consumers of the relevant type of 
valves would probably be confused as to the source of Bifold's 
Domino Junior valve or its affiliation (or lack thereof) with 
Versa.  Upon reviewing the trial record, with due regard for the 
labeling actually used by Bifold, we conclude that Versa failed 
to meet its burden, and that the district court's finding that 
Versa had shown a likelihood of confusion is clearly erroneous.  
We therefore will reverse the order of the district court, and 
vacate the permanent injunction and award of attorneys' fees 
against Bifold. 
                     
    
20
.    New Jersey's commmon law and statutory prohibitions of 
unfair competition (which address, inter alia, "passing off" 
one's goods as those of another manufacturer and unprivileged 
imitation) generally parallel the federal cause of action for 
unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  See 
SK&F, Co., 625 F.2d at 1065 (3d Cir. 1980).  Thus, "private 
labeling" does no more work for Versa under its state law unfair 
competition claim (see supra at 2, 22 & n.10) than it does under 
federal law. 
